The Reform of the EC Audiovisual Media Regulation : Television Without Cultural Diversity by Burri, Mira
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1120269
The Reform of the European Community
Audiovisual Media Regulation: Television
Without Cultural Diversity
Mira Burri Nenova*
Abstract: In the profoundly changing and dynamic world of contemporary
audiovisual media, what has remained surprisingly unaffected is regulation. In
the European Union, the new Audiovisual Media Services Directive (AVMS),
proposed by the European Commission on 13 December 2005, should allegedly
rectify this situation. Amending the existing Television without Frontiers
Directive, it should offer a “fresh approach” and meet the challenge of
appropriately regulating media in a complex environment. It is meant to
achieve a balance between the free circulation of TV broadcast and new
audiovisual media and the preservation of values of cultural identity and
diversity, while respecting the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality
inherent to the European Community (EC). This paper examines whether and
how the changes envisaged to the EC audiovisual media regime might
influence cultural diversity in Europe. It addresses subseqently the question of
whether the new AVMS properly safeguards the balance between competition
and the public interest in this regard, or whether cultural diversity remains a
mere political banner.
Thanks to the recently introduced Bluewin TV,1 Swiss consumers are now able to
use their fixed telephone line to comfortably enjoy the delights of a television offer
encompassing more than 100 television (TV) channels, 70 radio channels, and
500 video-on-demand films, including additional gadgets such as an electronic
program guide, a live pause function, and remote recording via mobile phone or
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the Internet. To the casual observer, this may seem like just another offer trying to
lure customers into spending more money. However, the more careful observer
notices some distinct features of Bluewin TV. One such notable characteristic is
that Bluewin TV is not an offer made by a conventional TV, satellite, or cable TV
distributor. Rather, it is a service provided by the Swiss telephony operator Swiss-
com AG, who as the former monopolist in the fixed telephony market, still enjoys
a significant market position in the markets for communications networks and
services in Switzerland.
Bluewin TV can indeed be construed as a most manifest (although certainly
not an exclusive2) example of the practical implementation of digitization3 and
convergence,4 particularly when one considers that it is based on the IPTV (In-
ternet Protocol television5) platform developed by Microsoft. The Bluewin TV
instance also clearly shows the degree of penetration of the digitization/convergence
phenomena into our everyday lives and our decreasing defiance of the ubiquity of
ones and zeroes.6
Before attempting an analysis of the regulatory implications of novel techno-
logical developments in the media, which is one of the objectives pursued by the
present article, it should be noted that both digitization and convergence have
progressed immensely in the last 5 years. As far as digitization is concerned,Moore’s
Law7 has remained valid and the potential of microprocessors has continued to
increase at a rapid pace, allowing the processing and storage of vast amounts of
information (be it audio, video, or text). Furthermore, almost all networks (in
developed and even in developing countries) have become Internet protocol based,8
allowing for swift transmission of data and thereby changing existing business and
consumer behavior patterns.9 As a process stemming from digitization,10 conver-
gence has also reached a new level of advancement. The long-heralded merging of
telecommunications, media and information technology services, networks, and
market players has become reality in many respects (albeit not in the originally
predicted shape and form11). There is now a real supply and, what is more im-
portant, a demand for converged services.12 Particularly on the broadband Inter-
net, different media, such as video gaming, music, streamed radio, and online
newspapers have proliferated and are widely accepted as substitutes for traditional
analog media.13 Beyond this, there is a new generation of Internet-based services
(such as social networking sites, blogs, and wikis): the so-called Web 2.0,14 which
emphasize online collaboration and enrich and stimulate the communication
environment.15
Among the various consequences of the advanced digitization/convergence,
we consider the increased importance of content as the core.16 A second notable
implication taken up in this discussion concerns the new ways of accessing and
consuming content, which also lead to new ways of creating it. Although in the
audiovisual media the progress of digitization/convergence has been less pro-
nounced (especially if compared with the most advanced convergence platform of
the Internet), the article argues that its repercussions could be the most far reach-
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ing. The availability of multiple new channels for distribution of content (and of
new content); the new opportunities for consumers to access and interact; and the
repositioning of global market players along the entire value chain of content cre-
ation, packaging, and distribution strongly influence all media and their role in
modern society. Such possibilities fundamentally change the character of commu-
nication and impinge on culture.17
In a world of profound changes and dynamism, what has remained surpris-
ingly unaffected is regulation. Particularly in respect of the audiovisual media, the
regulatory framework has remained literally unchanged since the onset of conver-
gence and despite the substantial modifications in the parallel telecommunica-
tions regime.18 In the European Union (EU), the new Audiovisual Media Services
Directive (AVMS), proposed by the European Commission on December 13, 2005,19
should allegedly rectify this situation. Amending the existing Television without
Frontiers Directive (TVWF),20 it should offer a “fresh approach”21 and meet the
challenge of appropriately regulating media in a complex and dynamic environ-
ment. It is meant to achieve a balance between the free circulation of TV broad-
cast and new audiovisual media and the preservation of values of cultural identity
and diversity, while respecting the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality
inherent to the European Community (EC).22
This article aims to examine whether and how the changes envisaged to the EC
audiovisual media regime might influence cultural diversity in Europe and, sub-
sequently, address the question of whether the new AVMS appropriately safe-
guards the balance between competition and the public interest in this regard.
The article tackles the aforementioned issues in four parts. With a few broad
brushstrokes, the first part outlines the development of the EC audiovisual media
regulation and its main tenets. The second part draws on this background and
discusses the proposed changes thereto. Part three examines their potential im-
pact on cultural diversity in Europe and questions the concept of cultural diver-
sity used by the Commission as a policy goal. Part four draws conclusions and
suggests that the AVMS does not appropriately address the new media environ-
ment and the balance between competition and cultural diversity as a legitimate
public interest objective may be endangered through its implementation.
OVERVIEW OF THE DEVELOPMENT AND THE CURRENT STATE
OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AUDIOVISUAL REGULATION
Broadcasting was not one of the original regulatory domains of the EC and was
not covered by the Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Commu-
nity in 1957. It was only with the Maastricht Treaty,23 which entered into force on
November 1, 1993, that the audiovisual sector was referred to explicitly, although
arguably different rules of the emerging body of community law touched on di-
verse aspects of media regulation even before the change took place.24
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The attempts to shape a distinct EC audiovisual policy began before the Maas-
tricht Treaty, however. They were triggered mostly by endogenous factors, which
were epitomized by the development of satellite broadcasting, the proliferation of
TV broadcasters, and the rapidly increasing deficit with the United States in au-
diovisual trade. The Green Paper on the Establishment of a Common Market in
Broadcasting of 198425 marked the beginning of the Community’s audiovisual
media policy. The latter advanced in parallel to but independently26 of the under-
takings of the Council of Europe (CoE). The CoE had indeed had a longer estab-
lished stance on media matters.27 It was also the first to adopt a regulatory act to
that effect with the Convention on Transfrontier Television (CTT).28
The EC decided to follow the blueprint of the CTT.29 Consequently, Council
Directive 89/552/EEC on the Coordination of Certain Provisions Laid Down by
Law, Regulation or Administrative Action in Member States Concerning the Pur-
suit of Television Broadcasting Activities,30 which was adopted in 1989, mirrors to
a great extent the structure and the basic provisions of the CTT.31 Since the be-
ginning of the 1990s,32 this directive,33 commonly known as the Television with-
out Frontiers Directive, has provided the essential regulatory framework for television
broadcasting and related activities at the Community level. As the prime EC reg-
ulatory tool for audiovisual media, the TVWF will be at the heart of this enquiry.
The TVWF can be best described as a liberalization measure. It is in essence a
concretization of the freedom of services under the specific conditions of televi-
sion, including a minimum level of partial harmonization,34 which ensures the
conditions necessary and sufficient for the consolidation of the single market for
media services.35 As a piece of secondary law, the directive follows the core prin-
ciples of freedom to provide services and freedom of establishment.36 Article 2(a)
of the TVWF explicitly guarantees these freedoms and provides that no member
state can restrict reception or retransmission of a broadcast from another mem-
ber state for reasons falling within the areas coordinated by the directive. The TVWF
regulates four major areas that cover the following:
1. Promotion of European works37 and works by independent producers38
2. Advertising, teleshopping and sponsoring39
3. Protection of minors and public order40
4. Right of reply41
The TVWF, in the amended version of 1997,42 ensures further that events, which
are regarded by a member state as of major importance to society (such as, most
manifestly, the Football World Cup), may not be broadcast in such a way (e.g., on
pay TV only), as to deprive a substantial part of the population of that member
state of the opportunity to watch them.43
The core principle of application of the lex specialis TVWF rules is the so-called
country of origin rule (also referred to as home State or sending State rule), whereby
each member state must ensure that all television broadcasters under its jurisdic-
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tion comply.44 The member state’s jurisdiction is defined through the principle of
country of establishment with specific practical criteria applying to its precise de-
termination (e.g., head office of the service provider; place where programing pol-
icy decisions are taken).45 Each broadcaster falls under the jurisdiction of one
member state only, and it is sufficient that the broadcasters comply with the law of
the member state from which they emanate.46 The receiving state cannot exercise
secondary control47 except under special, restrictively interpreted,48 derogations
(such as the protection of minors or prevention of incitement to hatred).49 How-
ever, it should not be forgotten that the TVWF defines only a minimum set of
common rules, and member states are free to impose more detailed or stricter
rules on broadcasters under their jurisdiction.50
With the benefit of hindsight and summarizing the 17 years of application of
the TVWF, one can argue that the TVWF has clearly been a success. It has con-
tributed to overcoming the existing fragmentation of national laws and, by facil-
itating the free circulation of television broadcasts, has fostered the European
audiovisual media industry. The numbers contained in the recent Commission
report on the implementation of the TVWF51 are unambiguous evidence in this
regard: Whereas at the beginning of 2001, more than 660 channels with potential
national coverage were broadcast via terrestrial transmitters, satellite, or cable,52 3
years later more than 860 such channels were active in the EU15.53 This should be
compared to the fewer than 90 channels existing in 1989.54 As the number of chan-
nels has grown, so have the revenues of broadcasters, which now make a substan-
tial contribution to overall economic growth.55
Yet, although these data show what the European Commission likes to describe
as a flourishing content industry,56 there is a flip side to the coin. Deregulation of
TV markets has had multiple, less glamorous, effects.57 The quantity of imported
programs and their costs have soared.58 Beyond this, and more importantly, the
quality and the range of programs on offer have been radically altered.59 The pur-
suit of a maximization of profits and a minimization of financial risks has re-
sulted in much “imitation, blandness and the recycling of those genres, themes
and approaches regarded as profitable.”60 The formats and contents of TV pro-
grams, films, and shows have become increasingly homogeneous.61 The tradi-
tional function of television, to inform, has been twisted and has become a
“tabloidization of news”62 and infotainment.63 The competitive pressure has also
changed the position of public service broadcasters and initiated a process of con-
vergence of the public and the commercial systems, in particular with respect to
their programing output.64
Against this backdrop, one could suggest that whilst the TVWF has clearly been
a “victory for commercial forces and those who favoured anti-protectionist poli-
cies,”65 it has done little for the achievement of cultural goals. Although, as men-
tioned earlier, the TVWF followed the CTT,66 the two acts had essentially different
bases. The latter initiative of the CoE had as its underlying rationale the freedom
of expression, enshrined in article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights
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(ECHR),67 while the act of the Community has been primarily a single market
measure.68 It is based on articles 47(2) and 55 EC (previously articles 57(2) and
66) and is a harmonization instrument meant to ensure that the free movements
of establishment and services are not distorted.
The intrinsic duality of audiovisual services as having both an economic and a
cultural nature, albeit repeatedly stated by the Community institutions, could not
be properly reflected at the EC level. The conflicting values and objectives belong-
ing to distinct differentiated societal spheres69 could not be appropriately resolved
through the chosen legal model. This became apparent not only in the provisions
of the TVWF, but was also later revealed by the failed attempt to adopt a directive
regulating media ownership70:“Tensions between ‘the economic aims of complet-
ing the single market [and] . . . the concern to protect cultural identity and a plu-
ralist media’ further complicate the more conventional EU conflicts between
interventionists and liberalisers, and between integrationalist and intergovernmen-
tal approaches.”71 Furthermore, they render a coherent media regulation at the
Community level unattainable. Paradoxically, it has been the EC competition rules
(in the sense of economic regulation), applying both in the fields of media and
telecommunications,72 that by fighting the concentration in media markets, safe-
guarded a certain level of content diversity.73 The next sections investigate whether
the new EC act regulating audiovisual media will be better able to meet the public
interest goal of protecting the diversity of cultural expressions and whether the
Community has indeed properly defined this goal.
THE NEED FOR A CHANGE AND STEPS LEADING TO THE AVMS
The TVWF directive incorporated an obligation for the Community to review it
by 2002.74 However, this was not the sole reason that prompted the revision. Nei-
ther can the reason be found in some of the shortcomings of the TVWF as an
instrument for regulating European audiovisual media, as hinted earlier. Rather,
the reason for a change was exogenous to the legal model and endogenous to the
audiovisual environment. The development and application of digital technolo-
gies, combined with strong convergence effects, as sketched at the beginning of
this article, have radically and irreversibly transformed the media landscape. They
have also triggered some specific developments in broadcasting markets, such as
increased pay-per-view, new nonlinear services delivery (e.g., video-on-demand),
peer-to-peer exchanges of audiovisual content, changed viewer habits, and new
advertising methods. Together, these phenomena and processes called for a mod-
ernized legal framework to fit the new reality of European broadcasting.75
Despite the wide agreement on the need for a change, the revision of the TVWF
has been a rough ride. It was an essential part of the overall reform, launched by
the Green Paper on Convergence in 1999,76 toward the turbulently developing,
technologically driven sectors of telecommunications, information technologies
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and audiovisual media. The reform of the media sector was indeed the last build-
ing block in this major undertaking of the Community, which is also endowed
with a specific role in the context of the Lisbon strategy to establish the EU as the
“most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world.”77
The actual review process of the TVWF commenced with the Fourth Commu-
nication on the Application of the TVWF Directive for the period 2001 to 2002.78
In an annex to this communication, the Commission proposed a work program
for the modernization of audiovisual services rules and a timetable of future
actions.79 The subsequent efforts80 focused on six priority areas, namely (1) rules
applicable to audiovisual content services (scope); (2) cultural diversity and pro-
motion of European and independent audiovisual production; (3) media plural-
ism; (4) commercial communications; (5) protection of minors and human dignity,
right of reply; and (6) rights to information and short reporting.81
Procedurally, the adoption of the AVMS was subject to the codecision formula
set out in article 251 EC, which involves the Commission, the Council, and the
European Parliament (EP). Key documents in this process are the original pro-
posal of the Commission of December 13, 2005;82 the Report of the Committee
on Culture and Education;83 the text adopted by the EP in first reading84 and the
subsequent Commission’s amended proposal.85 This analysis refers to the consol-
idated text.86
MAIN TENETS OF THE ENVISAGED REFORM
Of the various changes that the AVMS will bring about, we focus our attention on
three of the novel (and most contentious) solutions, which are likely to have sub-
stantial effect on the media ecosystem in Europe and on the diversity of cultural
expressions therein. These key issues are scope of the AVMS, rules on advertising,
and product placement.
Extended Scope of the AVMS
The first and most groundbreaking element of the reform involves a readjustment
of the scope of the directive. The Commission’s crucial argument in this respect is
that, given the impact that audiovisual media services have on the economy and
society, the AVMS rules should apply to all content services, irrespective of the
technology that delivers them. This is in stark contrast to the current situation,
where the different delivery modes receive different regulatory treatment and cause
regulatory asymmetries.
To remedy this situation, a broader, generic definition of audiovisual media ser-
vice was proposed, which also implies a larger scope for application of the AVMS.
Pursuant to article 187 thereof, an audiovisual media service is identified through
six essential elements, which must be simultaneously present: (1) a service within
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the meaning of the Treaty provisions (articles 49 and 50 EC); (2) provided under
editorial responsibility of a media service provider;88 (3) the principal purpose of
which is the provision of programs consisting of moving images with or without
sound;89 (4) to inform, entertain or educate; (5) to the general public; (6) by elec-
tronic communications networks.90 Pursuant to this definition, it is apparent that
any content service of commercial nature91 will be caught by the AVMS.
Linear and Nonlinear Audiovisual Media Services
Under the all-encompassing category of audiovisual media services, two subcat-
egories are defined, which as discussed in the following text are treated differently
under the AVMS regime. The first subcategory is that of television broadcast or
linear service. It covers audiovisual media services “provided by a media service
provider for simultaneous viewing of programmes on the basis of a programme
schedule.”92 The second subcategory comprises on-demand or nonlinear services,
which are offers of audiovisual content “for the viewing of programmes at the
moment chosen by the user and at his/her individual request on the basis of a
catalogue of programmes selected by the media service provider.”93
On the basis of these definitions, one can say that the rule-of-thumb for delim-
itating the categories of linear/nonlinear services is the possibility of choice and
control the user can exercise and also the impact they have on society (being
“pushed” to everyone or “pulled” individually).94
Taken together, the broader definition of audiovisual media service and the de-
lineation of the two categories have three important effects:
1. The overarching idea of platform-neutral content regulation is properly re-
flected, and the transport technology does not lead to the exclusion of any
content services from the reach of the AVMS.
2. Most importantly, the country of origin principle, as the core to the EC audio-
visual media regulation regime, is extended to all content services, including
the nonlinear. This minimum level of harmonization guarantees a function-
ing single market and prevents the emergence of an uneven playing field
laden with diverging national rules: Indeed, although it is often said that non-
linear services were previously unregulated, 19 out of the 25 member states
do already have some form of regulation.95 The rules at the Community level
allegedly also contribute to legal certainty, which supports the convergence
of linear and nonlinear on the supply side and creates a beneficial environ-
ment of consumer trust and product awareness.96
3. Some flexibility is preserved,which allows for a less stringent approach to new
media services. The regulation of conventional television broadcast (or linear
media services) remains almost unchanged (with some relaxation of the rules
on advertising and product placement, as discussed below). Nonlinear ser-
vices are subject to amuch lighter regime andwould have to satisfy only a basic
tier of rules. These rules cover the protection of minors and human dignity,
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right of reply, identification of commercial communications, and minimum
qualitative obligations regarding commercial communications.
The overall effect aspired to by the above-outlined reform was, in the words of
the European Commission, to increase choice, diversity, and investment in the Eu-
ropean audiovisual media leading to a “vibrant ‘audiovisual content without fron-
tiers’ industry that is strongly rooted in the EU.”97 Yet, this aspiration may remain
unfulfilled. In practical terms, the effects of the changes made cannot be unequiv-
ocally framed as positive. Although the TVWF affected only licensed broadcasters,
the AVMS now covers a much broader range of stakeholders, who formerly were,
if not unregulated, at least less regulated98 (e.g., by generic rules such as the
e-Commerce Directive99). Although the providers of nonlinear services only must
comply with the laws of their own member state, the regulatory burden on them
is substantial and may be detrimental.100 Innovation and entry of new market
players may be seriously hampered.101 User-generated content as an emerging fea-
ture of broadband use and the related business models such as Google and You-
Tube, which support the insertion of advertising into the more popular pieces of
content, are affected: the content producer, who chooses to accept advertising, is
subject to the AVMS as a nonlinear provider, even though the advertising itself is
chosen by the site host.102 This may be prohibitive for furthering the Web 2.0 ef-
fects of user-generated and distributed content, which is often central to consum-
ers’ Internet experience,103 and may suppress this new type of creativity.
New linear operators (e.g., new channel providers) also face relatively heavy reg-
ulatory burdens (in contrast to the incumbent linear operators for whom the nom-
inal burden is small). In seeking a reduction in sunk costs and realization of positive
network effects, content providers have the stimulus to consolidate, which re-
inforces concentration in the broadcasting markets104 and thus has a negative im-
pact on the diversity of cultural expressions in the European media environment.
“Cultural” Quotas for Nonlinear Services?
An immediate concern in the context of this new, broader definition of audiovi-
sual media services and cultural diversity is whether the existing quota mecha-
nisms for European works (article 4 TVWF) and for independent productions
(article 5 TVWF) are preserved under the AVMS regime. In the framework of
TVWF, article 4(1) prescribed that member states ensure “where practicable and
by appropriate means, that broadcasters reserve for European works a majority
proportion of their transmission time, excluding the time appointed to news, sports
events, games, advertising, teletext services and teleshopping.”105 This proportion
was to be achieved progressively, on the basis of suitable criteria.106 Article 5(1)
TVWF provided further that, where practicable and by appropriate means, broad-
casters reserve at least 10% of their transmission time, or alternatively, 10% of
their programing budget, for European works created by producers who are in-
dependent of broadcasters.
EC AUDIOVISUAL MEDIA REGULATION 177
Articles 4 and 5 TVWF were the only tools at Community level that were
intrinsically meant to serve cultural goals, ensuring a balance of offerings in the
EC broadcasting markets. Regardless of the implementation option chosen by
the individual member states,107 the impact study prepared for the TVWF re-
view108 showed that the measures to promote European and independent pro-
ductions have indeed had considerable impact. The average ratio of European
works in the qualifying transmission time of the channels increased from
52.1% in 1993 to 57.4% in 2002. The average proportion of independent pro-
ductions increased from 16.2% in 1993 to 20.2% in 2002 and the share of recent
independent productions from 11.3% to 15.7%.109 The impact study suggested
further that, taking into account these developments, there is no need to
change110 either the majority share for European works or the minimum share
for independent productions: Articles 4 and 5 TVWF were deemed to already be
achieving their cultural aims “inasmuch as . . . [they] have increased the propor-
tion of European works and independent productions broadcast by channels in
the EU.”111
The EU Commissioner for Information Society and Media, Viviane Reding was
delighted by the high share of airtime devoted to European works and stated that,
“This is proof of the high quality of Europe’s home-grown audiovisual content
and of the vitality of an audiovisual industry that draws upon Europe’s rich cul-
tural diversity.”112 It is arguable to the contrary that the higher share of European
productions is by no means a sign of increased (or existing) diversity of cultural
expressions. The definition of what qualifies as European work is neither based on
originality and quality criteria nor does it require a particular expression of na-
tional and European themes.113 It is based merely on the construct that most of
its authors and workers reside in one or more member states and comply with
one of the three conditions: (1) the work is made by one or more producers es-
tablished in a member state or states party to the CTT; (2) the production is su-
pervised and controlled by producer(s) established in one or more of those states;
or (3) the contribution of coproducers of those states to the total coproduction
costs is preponderant and the coproduction is not controlled by producer(s) es-
tablished outside those states.114
Indeed, in this shape and form, the cultural diversity rationale for the promo-
tion of European works is barely distinguishable from a protectionist one, aiming
to secure a certain amount of airtime for works produced with European money.115
It is noteworthy that the impact study could not prove that, in the absence of
articles 4 and 5 TVWF, the trade deficit with the United States116 would have been
larger and that the measures to promote the circulation of programs within the
EU have also promoted exports.117 We deem that such a definition of European
works and the related policy measures do little to prevent the increasing homog-
enization of content and deteriorating quality of programs.118 A “Big Brother”
type of TV show financed with European money qualifies perfectly as both a Eu-
ropean work and an independent production.
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The question of whether the quota mechanisms will be translated into the do-
main of nonlinear audiovisual services was key in the discussions of the AVMS.
They exposed yet again the existing divergences between the Community institu-
tions and between the Community and the member state levels, as well as the
profound conflict between the simultaneous pursuit of economic and cultural
goals.119 Most agreed that the quota system, as contained in the TVWF, will be
preserved under the AVMS but will apply only to linear (television broadcasting)
services. With regard to nonlinear services, there was a strong conviction that a
quota rule would be burdensome and in any case, difficult to install and track.
The AVMS does include a soft-law provision, however, which creates an obliga-
tion for the member states to ensure that media service providers under their ju-
risdiction “promote, where practicable and by appropriate means, production of
and access to European works.”120 The European Commission is further obliged
to report to the Parliament and the Council every 3 years on the application of
this provision, taking into consideration the market, technological developments
and the objective of cultural diversity.121
Interestingly, the AVMS also mentions that, at least technically, a quota mech-
anism is possible despite the entirely different characteristics of nonlinear audio-
visual services: The quotas may be based on the products on offer (instead of on
broadcasts as with linear services). They could take the form of a minimum share
of European works proportionate to economic performance, a minimum share of
European works in video-on-demand catalogs, or the attractive presentation of
European works in electronic program guides.122
The question is therefore not so much whether imposing quotas is still doable.
It is more fundamental: Has the increase in consumer choice and multichannel
capacity rendered the rules on broadcasting quotas obsolete? And related to this:
Is there a need for a new legal model ensuring the diversity of cultural expressions
in the new audiovisual media settings?
Before looking into these questions, one needs to acknowledge a few things per-
tinent in this context. Firstly, that the linear and nonlinear market segments do
compete, at least indirectly.123 In the long term, nonlinear audiovisual media ser-
vices have the potential to partially replace linear services, a fact also admitted by
the European legislator.124 Secondly, the effects of a quota mechanism for nonlin-
ear services are quite unpredictable and may even have diametrically opposed out-
comes. A first option is that consumers (empowered by technology) would simply
not choose European works and thus render any investment/catalog quota inef-
fective. Another rather different option is an application of the so-called Long Tail
theory.125 This means that in the new environment of indefinitely diverse media,
the consumer selection constantly discovers niche products and/or generates new
ones (similarly to the Amazon bookselling platform126). Consumers are stimu-
lated to consume products otherwise unavailable to them (because of the scarcity
of time slots in TV schedules) and thus induce markets to develop new types of
content, such as archived European content, original works, documentaries, or
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director’s cuts.127 This may ultimately lead to a higher share of available and ef-
fectively consumed European works, which, if realized, will be a genuine expres-
sion of cultural diversity.
As a tentative conclusion based on the aforementioned text and as an answer to
the questions raised, the European legislator took a rather unimaginative ap-
proach in addressing cultural policy objectives at the Community level in the face
of new technological developments, changed business, and consumer behavior pat-
terns. Preserving the status quo quota system for linear services and creating soft-
law stimulus for nonlinear services is by no means an adequate answer to the
dynamic and complex environment of audiovisual media and the redefined need
to safeguard some diversity in it. Quota mechanisms based on the existing defi-
nition of European works are in any case of dubious cultural value. However, the
parties involved in the AVMS legislative process seemed unwilling to take up and
pursue the controversial cultural questions and reignite the latent conflicts be-
tween integrationists and intergovernmentalists, interventionists, and liberalizers
when other, notably economic, interests were at stake.
Audiovisual Commercial Communications
The second major reform brought by the AVMS is in the area of advertising, or
what is now referred to as audiovisual commercial communications. This is indeed
a most crucial area of media regulation, because advertising is the main source of
revenue for European television broadcasters and likely to remain so.128 The gross
television advertising market has consistently expanded and reached Y25.7 billion
for the EU15 in 2004, which is a 7.2% increase in relation to 2003.129 As far as new
media are concerned, Internet advertising and computer games revenues are
the fastest growing share of media spending and expected to continue growing
considerably.130
Similarly to the audiovisual media service definition, the concept of audiovisual
commercial communication is a broad one. It is a notion taken from the e-Commerce
Directive with an almost identical content131 and is meant to encapsulate all rules
related to advertising. It is defined as follows:
Images with or without sound which are designed to promote, directly
or indirectly, the goods, services or image of a natural or legal entity
pursuing an economic activity. Such images accompany or are included
in a programme in return for payment or for similar consideration or
for self-promotional purposes. Forms of audiovisual commercial com-
munication include, inter alia, television advertising, sponsorship, tele-
shopping and product placement.132
In the so-defined domain of audiovisual commercial communications, the first
objective of the reform undertaken was to secure a basic tier of rules at the EC
level, which would provide legal certainty across all member states. Thus, pursu-
ant to the AVMS, all audiovisual commercial communications must comply with
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the principles laid down in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European
Union and, in particular they must not prejudice respect for human dignity; in-
clude any discrimination on grounds of race, sex or, nationality; offend religious
or political beliefs; encourage behavior prejudicial to health or safety; or encour-
age behavior grossly prejudicial to the protection of the environment.133 Further,
all forms of commercial communications regarding cigarettes and other tobacco
products, medicinal products, and medical treatment available only on prescrip-
tion are prohibited.134 Special care has also been taken for the protection of
minors.135
The second objective of the TVWF review in the field of audiovisual commer-
cial communications was to deregulate them and adopt a lighter, flexible approach
allowing more possibilities for broadcasters and content providers to increase the
value of advertising time, which would also properly reflect the more multifaceted
media environment.136 According to the principles of flexibility and simplicity pur-
sued, the European Commission introduced two blocks of changes:
1. A relaxation of the rules on the insertion of advertising in TV programs and
daily advertising limits
2. New regulation of product placement
The following text looks into these and contemplates their justifications and po-
tential effects on cultural diversity.
Rules on Advertising
The AVMS removes some of the existing quantitative limits on advertising. The
current 3-hours-per-day limit on advertising is dropped, because practical expe-
rience has shown that in fact no TV channel comes close to it. The 12-minute
upper limit on all advertising in any given hour is maintained, however.137 As to
the insertion of advertising, the European Commission was eager to grant broad-
casters more freedom to choose the most suitable moment for advertisements
within the programs. Yet, the EP was adamant in this regard and insisted on the
principle that advertising and teleshopping spots can be inserted only between pro-
grams. In its amended proposal after EP’s first reading, the Commission avoided
an explicit formulation of this rule and stated only that, member states must en-
sure, “where advertising or teleshopping is inserted during programmes, that the
integrity of the programmes, taking into account natural breaks in and the dura-
tion and the nature of the programme” is not prejudiced.138
The frequency of advertising breaks was a hot topic in the discussions of the
AVMS. In its initial proposal, the European Commission foresaw a minimum of
35 minutes between the advertisements inserted in films made for television (ex-
cluding series, serials, light entertainment programs, and documentaries), cinemat-
ographic works, and children’s and news programs. The proposal of the EP
Committee on Culture and Education reversed this to the TVWF benchmark of
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45 minutes and included concerts, theater plays, and operas in the provision. In-
terestingly, the text adopted by the Parliament at first reading ignores the proposal
of its own committee and even goes below the minimum suggested by the Com-
mission. The rule is now that films made for television (excluding series, serials
and documentaries), cinematographic works, and news programs may be inter-
rupted by advertising and/or teleshopping once for each scheduled period of at
least 30 minutes.139
Thus, although the EP has normally put brakes on the European Commission’s
spur to liberalize advertising in audiovisual media, it is apparent here that the will-
ingness to allow more freedom to broadcasters has prevailed. This will undoubt-
edly give better opportunities for broadcasters and content providers to monetize
but will also speed up the already advanced commercialization of television.140
Trying to show the programs of greatest appeal in the most valuable time slots to
attract advertising naturally leads to marginalization of specific, original pro-
grams and those that otherwise diverge from the mainstream.
Rules on Product Placement
The second important change in the domain of audiovisual commercial commu-
nications is the newly formulated attitude toward product placement.141 Product
placement is defined as “any form of audiovisual commercial communication con-
sisting of the inclusion of or reference to a product, a service or the trade mark
thereof so that it is featured within audiovisual media services, normally in return
for payment or for similar consideration.”142
In the Commission’s original proposal, product placement was fully legitimized
and taken as an essential element of advertising techniques. The opposition was
too strong, however. The compromise reached is to preserve the ban on product
placement, but it is no longer an outright ban.143 Product placement is now per-
mitted in cinematographic works, films, and series made for audiovisual media
services, light entertainment, and sports programs.144 Such programs must re-
spect certain conditions; they should never affect or jeopardize the editorial re-
sponsibility and independence of the media service provider, nor should they
“directly encourage the purchase or rental of goods or services” or give “undue
prominence to the product in question.”145 Following the general rule of separate
and clearly identifiable commercial communications,146 viewers are to be appro-
priately informed of the existence of product placement at the start and at the end
of the program, and when a program resumes after an advertising break.147 In any
event, product placement for tobacco products, cigarettes, or medicinal products
and medical treatments available on prescription only is not allowed.148
It is imperative to note here that, although the EP limited the scope of the le-
gitimization of product placement, what is allowed is not negligible; indeed, the
major audiovisual formats of cinematographic works, films, and series made for
television and sports broadcasts do allow product placement.
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The Commission argues that by providing a clear framework for product place-
ment, new revenues for the European audiovisual industry would be secured. This
would increase its competitiveness, especially vis-à-vis the U.S. media industry,149
where product placement accounts for 1.7% of the total advertising revenues of
free-to-air broadcasters and increased by an average of 21% per year between 1999
and 2004.150 More oddly, the Commission also believes that the new rules on prod-
uct placement will “help to boost our creative economy and thus reinforce cul-
tural diversity.”151 Indeed, both the rules on advertising and the rules on product
placement are seen as “further instruments safeguarding cultural diversity.”152
Although the less restrictive EC regime on product placement may be some-
what justified in view of its value as a financial source for content providers and
to prevent the emergence of multiple national rules distorting the single market, it
is difficult for us to see how product placement contributes to cultural diversity.
The nature of product placement is such that it is an integral part of the fic-
tional work or sports event.153 Because of this essential characteristic, the viewer
cannot simply skip the advertisement or switch channels until the commercial break
is over. Furthermore, often part of the story line of fictional works and thus part
of the reality they represent as product placement’s attractant effect may be much
stronger than that of conventional advertising in commercial breaks. The com-
mercial intention of product placement is indeed partly concealed and therefore
less obtrusive or even not realized at all by the recipients, who cannot avoid this
type of integrated advertising easily.154 With the advances in technology enabling
consumers to pull content individually, the incentives to include product place-
ment will increase for the content providers as well as the companies whose prod-
ucts and services are advertised. This will naturally lead to an increase in the
quantity and quality of product placement (in the sense that its intertwining with
the plot will be perfected thus multiplying its effects155). Thereby, the commodi-
fication of artistic productions156 will be strongly intensified and diversity of cul-
tural expressions smothered rather than stimulated.
CONCLUSION ON THE IMPACT OF THE AVMS
ON CULTURAL DIVERSITY
As already noted, the precise effects of the regulatory changes undertaken and the
development of the diverse audiovisual media markets are hard to predict.
The extreme nature of the predictive challenge is due to the unusual
volatility of content markets and citizen tastes in media consumption,
which rely on network effects to a great extent (especially in non-linear
demand patterns) as well as having extreme economies of scale because
of the perfect reproducibility of digital content.157
The concrete implications for the diversity of cultural expressions are even harder
to predict because cultural diversity itself is a dynamic parameter.
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Despite the constraints of prediction, some trends in the development of Eu-
ropean audiovisual media are already discernible. The completely new landscape
described in the beginning of this article is likely to continue its transformation
gradually but profoundly.158 The multiplication of channels for content distribu-
tion is likely to go on. By 2010 to 2014 (i.e., within the projected lifetime of the
AVMS), most member states will have completed the transition to digital sig-
nal.159 On this transition, every household will receive between 20 and 40 free
TV channels.160 This growth in channel choice will reduce the total audience
share of the primary channels161 and the share of individual primary channels
in each member state. Audience fragmentation will put revenue pressure on the
primary channels (especially commercial ones) and undermine the public fund-
ing of leading public primary channels.162 Furthermore, the new media distribu-
tion channels, above all broadband, will draw consumers away from traditional
entertainment media, further reducing the audience share of primary chan-
nels.163 Pulling individual content through digital TV or Internet channels is an
emergent consumer behavior pattern likely to change the business models of
content providers, distributors, and advertisers and further fragment the media
environment. Whichever pattern of access to and use of audiovisual content pre-
vails,164 it is apparent that the split between multichannel and analog house-
holds, already a reality, will become more pronounced.165 If Internet penetration
is to stabilize at 65% to 75% by household and mobile phone penetration at
85%,166 this means that a substantial proportion of people will remain offline.
This minority is “both the most vulnerable in society and least likely to change
(typically comprising the most elderly, non-formally qualified and/or poorest
quartiles).”167
The broader picture of the European media landscape will thus be one of in-
creased fragmentation of audiences and increasing gap between the digital haves
and have-nots. At the same time, a concentration among the diverse market play-
ers, both horizontally and vertically, is expected, so they can make better use of all
the existing channels (e.g., by placing a single video clip on broadband, mobile,
and digital TV networks) and benefiting from economies of scale. Such an envi-
ronment makes the design of an appropriate regulatory model extremely difficult,
in particular where the objective of catering for public interest is concerned. The
focus of this article is on only one of these objectives, namely the sustainability of
the diversity of cultural expressions in audiovisual media.
Cultural diversity has always been defined as one of the vital justifications for
European audiovisual media policy. At its very onset, epitomized by the Rhodes
Summit of the European Council, the Council stressed that the future TVWF ini-
tiative should “provide an opportunity of demonstrating the richness and diver-
sity of European culture”168 and “contribute to a substantial strengthening of a
European cultural identity. . . .”169 Later, when formulating the principles of the
Community’s audiovisual strategy for the digital age, the European Commission
stated the following:
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The audiovisual industry is . . . not an industry like any other and does
not simply produce goods to be sold on the market like other goods. It
is in fact a cultural industry par excellence. It has a major influence on
what citizens know, believe and feel and plays a crucial role in the trans-
mission, development and even construction of cultural identities.170
In the AVMS, the Parliament was particularly insistent on the amendment of
recital 3, which, pursuant to the EP’s formulation, held the following:
Audiovisual media services are as much cultural goods as they are eco-
nomic goods. Their growing importance for societies, democracy—in
particular by ensuring freedom of information, diversity of opinion and
media pluralism—education, and culture justifies the application of spe-
cific rules to these services, and the enforcement of those rules, notably
in order to preserve the fundamental rights and freedoms laid down in
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, the Euro-
pean Convention for Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Free-
doms and the United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Freedoms,
and in order to ensure the protection of minors and vulnerable and dis-
abled people.171
Despite these lengthy deliberations and handsome rhetoric, this examination of
the major provisions of the AVMS found no concrete solutions addressing cul-
tural diversity considerations or any of the values innate to cultural identity and
diversity. The future-proof broad definition of audiovisual media services would
allow for increasing the reach of the Community media framework and an ex-
tension of the economically beneficial country of origin principle. However, the
regulation of nonlinear services may be onerous for smaller market players or in-
dividual providers of content, which may in turn create a barrier to newly emerg-
ing creativity and online content distribution. The preservation of the status quo
regarding quotas for European works and independent productions, which re-
main applicable to television broadcast but not to nonlinear services, is a mere
political compromise, which disregards the new technological developments and
the increasing fragmentation of audiences. In its present form, one can argue that
it bears no real relation to cultural policy objectives; and even if achieved, the
quotas do not reflect cultural diversity. With respect to advertising and product
placement, it can also be argued that the liberalizing rationales have prevailed and
there are no genuine considerations of protecting and promoting the diversity of
cultural expressions.
The amazing gap between the rhetoric of the European legislator and the real-
ity of the regulatory instruments adopted in the AVMS also reveals no real un-
derstanding of what cultural diversity in audiovisual media is. Indeed, this at times
frivolous waving of the banner of cultural diversity may undermine the very value
of this notion.
Pursuant to the definition given by UNESCO in its Convention on the Protec-
tion and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions,172 cultural diversity
is defined as
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the manifold ways in which the cultures of groups and societies find
expression. These expressions are passed on within and among groups
and societies. Cultural diversity is made manifest not only through the
varied ways in which the cultural heritage of humanity is expressed, aug-
mented and transmitted through the variety of cultural expressions, but
also through diverse modes of artistic creation, production, dissemina-
tion, distribution, and enjoyment, whatever the means and technologies
used.173
This all-encompassing concept of cultural diversity and the inherent complexity
of the notion of culture174 admittedly make it hard to delineate clear-cut contours
of cultural diversity in audiovisual media. The tendency to give different conno-
tations to the concept of cultural diversity in different contexts (e.g., ethnocentric
in the UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity,175 as cultural multiplicity in
the context of the protection of traditional cultural expressions in societies with
indigenous and immigrant communities,176 or as media pluralism177) is not very
helpful either.
It should have been precisely the task of the European legislator to find the
contours of cultural diversity and then to examine the regulatory options. In the
concrete setting of audiovisual media, such an endeavor could follow the basic
lines:
Diverse is such a cultural landscape, where next to the big commercial
productions, which pursue above all maximisation of viewers’ numbers,
there is the possibility for existence of other productions—productions
that depart from the “mainstream” through, for instance, the original
touch of their author, their “low budget” production costs, experimental
or avant-garde nature, or due to other reasons, which stimulate the fan-
tasy and thoughts of the public.178
Looking at the markets for audiovisual media services, the Community legislator
may then examine possible objective parameters for measuring diversity. Moreau
and Peltier suggest, for example, three dimensions of diversity: variety, balance,
and disparity.179 By quantifying them, they attempt an analysis of national film
markets,180 thereby allowing for an assessment of the efficiency of the different
cultural policy measures taken.181 The EC is undoubtedly free in its choice of ap-
proaches but not, we argue, free to simply protect European media under the dis-
guise of cultural diversity policy.
COMMITMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY TO THE
PROTECTION OF CULTURAL DIVERSITY
An almost perfect justification for the lack of real provisions on the protection
and promotion of cultural diversity in the AVMS is that the European Commu-
nity has no explicit regulatory competence on these issues. Indeed, the relatively
fuzzy definition of the scope of the Community competences in article 151 EC182
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and above all the principle of subsidiarity, leave little room for the Community
action. The member states are meant to pursue their own cultural policy goals as
they see fit, and the Community has repeatedly confirmed the conformity of mea-
sures intended to their achievement with EC law. In addition to the derogations to
the free movements explicitly formulated in article 30 EC, it was in Cassis de Di-
jon183 that the Court of Justice developed an open-ended list of mandatory re-
quirements (also known as imperative requirements or overriding requirements in
the public interest).184 Cultural policy measures implemented in the audiovisual
sector fall within this category and “constitute an overriding requirement relating
to the general interest which justifies a restriction on the freedom to provide ser-
vices.”185 Thus, the creation of the single market, while certainly being the more
dominant goal of the Community policies, allows the parallel existence of other
objectives, including within the domain of culture.186 It is important to note, how-
ever, that the Community courts have been protecting these public interest goals
only negatively, in the sense of an exception from the freedom to provide services,
rather than in the positive manner of the European Court of Human Rights when
interpreting and applying the freedom of speech provision of article 10 ECHR.187
The new audiovisual media environment, elements of which previously de-
scribed, calls however for a positive and comprehensive approach at the Commu-
nity level. A puzzle of fragmented measures at the member state level would not
work properly in an ecosystem of increasingly fragmented audiences, multiple chan-
nels, and sophisticated technologies enabling consumer’s choice and control. Sub-
sidized programing and national rules of origin will affect a continually diminishing
slice of the average household’s content alternatives.188 Furthermore, the mea-
sures taken at the national level often appear to be pursuing more protectionist
than cultural goals, thereby leading to both distortion of the market mechanisms
and devaluation of the cultural objectives.189
Furthermore, as parties to the UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity, the
EC member states and the European Community itself190 have clearly taken, if
not legally binding obligations,191 at least an engagement with regard to the pro-
tection and promotion of cultural expressions and need to meet these aims.192
SUMMARY
A revision usually entails a correction, improvement and/or an update. The AVMS
is an update but hardly an improvement on the previous TVWF regime, in par-
ticular as far as its contribution to cultural diversity in the European media is
concerned. The AVMS also reveals that, at the Community level as well as in the
member states, “cultural policy making is in a profound state of transition as the
audiovisual sector moves from being a separable and quarantined domain of gov-
ernance to its enactment as part of a whole-of-government modelling in which it
emerges as a service industry in a ‘digital economy.’”193
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When examining the provisions of the AVMS, we exposed a wide gap between
the cultural diversity rhetoric and the real instruments put in place by the
Community legislator. The lack of a clear and comprehensive vision of how to
approach the new dynamic multifaceted audiovisual environment and the misun-
derstanding and/or ignoring of new phenomena and processes is also apparent.
This may have unintended consequences in numerous directions, such as reduced
creativity or wrong incentivizing of European content producers. Isolated actions
such as the promotion of coproductions may have also dubious effects, and may
even lead to a loss of cultural diversity as producers focus on the lowest common
cultural denominator and move from unique concepts to the development of for-
mats for the global marketplace.194
Furthermore, it is obvious that the EC legislator in its cultural policy endeavors
still tends to stick to versions of international relations theory stressing the com-
petitiveness of nations vis-à-vis others as the primary governance problem.195 The
High Level Group on Audiovisual Policy was deeply convinced, for example, that:
At the heart of the matter is the question of whether the predicted ex-
plosion in demand for audiovisual material will be met by European
productions or by imports. . . . The danger is that the channel prolifer-
ation brought about digital technology will lead to further market frag-
mentation, making it more difficult for European producers to compete
with American imports.196
To put it simply, it is argued in contrast that cultural diversity in European media
is certainly not a question of whether the European production of “Big Brother”
will be replaced by a U.S. production of “Big Sister.”
We deem that in its present form the AVMS, while securing a competitive en-
vironment and also providing for legal certainty for new media, does not actively
contribute to the diversity of cultural expressions in European audiovisual media.
In the new audiovisual media landscape and taking account of the changed pat-
terns of viewers’ and businesses’ behavior, a set of new priorities is emerging, which
should be carefully considered and reflected in the overall Community framework
of audiovisual media policy. In no particular order, these involve the following:
1. Make full use of the phenomena of digital media distribution and content
creation in the sense of prolonging the Long Tail, which may include inter
alia efforts to digitize all European content, facilitate the search of such con-
tent,197 and create public awareness in this respect.
2. Stimulate the Web 2.0 effects in user-generated content creation and harness
the new creativity.
3. Reduce the asymmetry of information between the digital haves and the dig-
ital have-nots: Provision of diverse content in nondigitized form and active
promotion of media literacy. The latter may be a vital asset to actively choos-
ing, filtering, consuming, and creating media, thus shaping communication
and culture.
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4. Rethink the role of public service broadcasters in the new media setting.
5. Create proper incentives for the production of European works using crite-
ria not simply based on their origin.
Admittedly, the EC has been already taking steps in some of these directions
(e.g., media literacy,198 content online,199 and content production with the Media
2007 program200), but there is a significant lack of coherence and prioritization.
Although “coherence has never been the strongest aspect of EU audio-visual pol-
icy,”201 it may become indispensable in the new digital media environment.
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